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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of adopting a post-grant review institution in the US 
patent system by comparing the “opposition careers” of European Patent Office (EPO) 
equivalents of litigated US patents to those of a control group of EPO patents.  We 
demonstrate several novel methods of "twinning" US and European patents and 
investigate the implications of employing these different methods in our data analysis.  
We find that EPO equivalents of US litigated patent applications are more likely to be 
awarded EPO patent protection than are equivalents of unlitigated patents, and the 
opposition rate for EPO equivalents of US litigated patents is about three times higher 
than for equivalents of unlitigated patents. Patents attacked under European opposition 
are shown to be either revoked completely or narrowed in about 70 percent of all 
cases.  For EPO equivalents of US litigated patents, the appeal rate against opposition 
outcomes is considerably higher than for control-group patents.  Based on our 
estimates, we calculate a range of net welfare benefits that would accrue from 
adopting a post-grant review system. Our results provide strong evidence that the 
United States could benefit substantially from adopting an administrative post-grant 
patent review, provided that the post-grant mechanism is not too costly. 
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1 Introduction and Research Questions 
The optimal design of national patent systems has been a topic of recurring interest (Kahn, 
1940; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).  A well-functioning patent system 
is considered an effective means of spurring inventiveness, technological advancement and 
economic growth—but social benefits can be substantially eroded by poorly designed systems 
that produce, among other costly outcomes, low patent quality and high uncertainty (Hall, et 
al. 2004).  One mechanism that has been proposed to improve the operation of patent systems 
is the post-grant patent quality review (The National Academies, 2004). 
In the United States, the effectiveness of patent post-grant review has become particularly 
relevant.  A number of prominent US policy panels have recommended the adoption of a 
post-grant review procedure to improve the US patent system.  The US Federal Trade 
Commission (2003), the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or Patent Office) (2003), 
and the American Intellectual Property Law Association (2004) have followed a major 
academic study on patent reform produced by the National Research Council (2003) and 
earlier work by Merges (1999) in calling for some form of effective post-grant administrative 
review of patent quality.  The evidence on which each of these proposals build shows that:  
litigation is currently the only effective mechanism for challenging US patent quality ex post; 
litigation is a costly—and at times extremely costly—mechanism for testing patent validity; 
and patent litigation may be undersupplied, i.e. society sees fewer patent challenges than is 
optimal (Graham et al. 2003; Levin and Levin, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Farrell and Merges, 
2004).1   
Among the perceived benefits flowing from a post-grant review are greater certainty, a 
reduction in the costs society suffers from patent litigation, an increase in society's benefits 
from a hastening of the pace of innovation, and a limitation on unwarranted grants of market 
power.  Uncertainty over the validity of property rights may be particularly pernicious 
because unwarranted market power may deter the entry of competitive products, while 
blocking the development of cumulative downstream technologies.  Uncertainty may also 
encourage "bad bets," with agents misallocating investment away from promising 
technologies or into technologies that turn out to be infringing ex post.  Associated benefits 
may include an improvement in patent quality and the establishment of an early feedback 
mechanism to patent examiners as regards the quality of their work.   
The simple logic supporting the adoption of an opposition system says that it offers a 
relatively low-cost opportunity for parties with superior knowledge to challenge the validity 
of patents.  These parties are envisaged to be product-market competitors of the patentee, and 
are expected to have superior knowledge than the patent examiner concerning the novelty, 
obviousness, and technological- and market-development of the patented technology.  It is 
suggested that a US opposition system would invite these “knowledgeable parties” into the 
process at an early stage, permitting them to disclose information about the patentability of 
the invention, thereby allowing for a more effective policing of the system and possibly 
leading to an improvement of patent quality in the system as a whole. 
                                                 
1 At time of writing, a proposal largely mirroring that of the American Intellectual Property Law Association 
(AIPLA) was pending as a bill before the US Congress as House Resolution 2795 titled "The Patent Reform 
Act of 2005," co-sponsored by Reps. Howard Berman (D.-Calif.) and Lamar Smith (R.-Texas). 
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Despite the positive assessment that post-grant review has received from the academic and 
administrative bodies, there remain open questions as to the efficacy and possible 
shortcomings of such an institution, particularly as it may apply in the United States.  While 
post-grant reviews have been an integral part of the patent systems of several countries (such 
as Australia, PR China, Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland), the 
innovation system in the United States is unique (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993) and thus 
makes the impact of a newly introduced post-grant mechanism in the US patent system 
difficult to predict.  Reservations about the applicability of a review process in the US arise 
from the presumption that the opposition would increase, rather than lower, transaction costs 
and thus lead to a reduction in efficiency. 
While the US has considerable experience with various levels of administrative patent 
process, including the re-examination procedure (Graham, et al., 2003) and patent 
interferences (Cohen and Ishii, 2005), yet another layer of process added to the patent system 
may raise costs without sufficient corresponding benefits.  This concern is particularly 
relevant given criticisms over inadequate funding at the Patent Office (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) 
since that agency will likely have primary responsibility for administering any such system, 
thereby burdening an already burdened USPTO.  Moreover, costs may be imposed dispropor-
tionately among players in the innovation system.  If (as we detail below) the expected cost of 
an opposition is significantly less than the cost of court litigation, the lower cost of 
challenging patent validity will likely result in challenges becoming more common, possibly 
imposing additional costs on patentees. These costs might substantially change the ex ante 
expected returns to patenting for inventors.   
In the face of these opposing arguments, and the quickly moving policy environment, we 
offer an empirical study to inform the controversy.  The arguments against, and in support, of 
the adoption of a post-grant patent review have heretofore been based, at best, on anecdotal 
evidence.  Several fundamental questions have remained unanswered thus far:  What effects 
will the United States adopting a post-grant review process have upon rates of patent 
litigation?  And can society anticipate welfare gains from a (potentially) more cost-effective 
and rapid resolution of uncertainty concerning patent validity?  Our paper uses novel data and 
methods to address these questions. 
We employ a kind of twin study design applied in Graham et al. (2003) to US patent re-
examination and European opposition.  In this paper, we consider the “opposition career” of 
equivalents of US litigated patents at the European Patent Office (EPO).  We improve upon 
this earlier method, however, by employing a more fully developed twinning methodology, 
and demonstrating three possible methods by which patents in one patent-granting jurisdiction 
may be matched to related patents in another jurisdiction.   
Comparing outcomes in the two systems is attractive, since the EPO is today the dominant 
patent-granting institution in Europe. Moreover, much of the US policy debate has taken EPO 
opposition and appeal proceedings as a reference point, insofar as the European institution 
appears to be effective.2 
The research questions considered in this paper are as follows: 
                                                 
2 See Harhoff (2005) for a multivariate analysis of opposition and appeal at the EPO. 
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• Do twins (equivalents) of litigated US patents fare better or worse in the examination 
phase of the European patent system than suitably defined control-group patents? In 
other words, does European examination detect and exclude contested patents in the 
early phase of the patent granting process? 
• To what extent is the European equivalent of a litigated US patent more likely to be 
involved in an opposition proceeding than a suitably defined control group patent? 
• Are equivalents of US litigated patents more likely to be revoked or narrowed in 
opposition proceedings than suitably defined control group patents? 
• Given our empirical findings, what are the cost/benefit implications to society of the 
adoption of a post-grant administrative proceeding in the United States?  
In answering these questions, we focus first on the “twin relationship” or “equivalence” 
between European and US patents, thus identifying patents in the two jurisdictions that cover 
nearly identical inventions or technology disclosures.  This relationship is defined by the 
congruence of the priority documents upon which the US and the European patent are based. 
We also demonstrate in this paper the broader notion of a “family relationship” between 
national patents. This latter relationship encompasses some degree of relationship between the 
two underlying technologies, but does not require that the patents be strictly “equivalents,” 
i.e. congruence of priority documents of the respective patents. We discuss these distinctions 
in detail below, intending to contribute to a better understanding of international comparisons 
of patent systems.  Clarifying and making use of the complex priority linkages between US 
and European patents is a novel contribution. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study 
has yet described, or made use of, these different relationships between national patents. 
We find that EPO applications based on US-litigated patents have a higher grant rate at the 
EPO than the equivalents of non-litigated patents. Evidence suggests that owners of these 
patents are willing to compromise on the scope of their property rights in order to obtain a 
patent. In support, we find that, for the EPO twins of litigated US patents, the grant rates are 
higher and grant lags are longer as compared to the twins of non-litigated patents. 
Examination-based statistics such as the number and types of (backward) patent references do 
not appear to distinguish strongly between the two groups. We confirm, however, that the 
equivalents of litigated patents are considerably more likely to be cited by subsequent patents  
and to constitute prior art that is considered harmful to the novelty claim of subsequent 
patents. 
We also demonstrate an important difference in the opposition rates of litigated equivalents as 
compared to non-litigated control equivalents.  This crucial difference arises in the increased 
likelihood of opposition in litigated and “twinned” US patents:  the opposition rate is 
approximately 20 percent, and thus about three times higher for equivalents and “relatives” of 
litigated patents than for control group patents. Opposition outcomes are again largely non-
discriminatory if we take effective results into account. Oppositions against the equivalents of 
litigated patents are somewhat less successful than oppositions against control group patents. 
Moreover, it appears that owners of equivalents of litigated patents frequently withdraw their 
patents from the opposition process by letting the patent lapse, presumably in order to avoid 
an unfavorable opposition ruling. Owners of equivalents of US litigated patents are also more 
likely to file an appeal against an unfavorable opposition outcome. We account for this effect 
when considering the welfare impact of a future opposition system in the US.  
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Our results support the notion that the European system excludes equivalents of litigated US 
patents due to an increased likelihood of opposition, and not by virtue of lower grant rates or 
less favorable opposition outcomes. We argue that this finding has important policy 
implications in that it emphasizes the need for making opposition proceedings affordable and 
accessible to any party with information regarding a patent’s (in)validity. 
At the very core of our study is a conceptual question: to what extent would a post-grant 
review mechanism at the USPTO improve welfare?  Two possible effects are considered. 
First, we consider that post-grant review would introduce a mechanism that would allow some 
questionable patents to be revoked or narrowed at an early stage, thus reducing the likelihood 
of these becoming expensive litigation cases.  Second, we consider that a post-grant review 
system may generate benefits by revoking patents that do not now enter subsequent litigation, 
but without review are generating welfare losses due to excessive market power. In a high-
cost litigation system such as the United States, such patents may never be challenged 
because obtaining a license, or finding a “work-around” to the patent, is preferred by 
competitors to challenging the patent’s validity (even if its validity is questionable). Building 
on earlier work in Hall et al. (2003), but using our own estimates of opposition likelihood and 
outcome distributions, we present several calculations of welfare benefits that summarize the 
impact of post-grant reviews. Our results confirm the idea that introducing a low-cost post-
grant review mechanism would allow for large welfare gains. Typical benefit-cost ratios are 
on the order of eight and higher according to these calculations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 offers information of the 
institutional background of this study, both in terms of US litigation and EPO opposition 
proceedings.  Section 3 follows with a discussion of data issues, demonstrating our techniques 
for collection and analysis of US patent litigation and the construction of a control group of 
patents.  We also document in this section patent characteristics, the opposition frequency, 
and outcomes of opposition proceedings for “twins” of patents litigated in the US and for the 
respective control group.  In section 4, we use these statistics to provide an estimate of the 
welfare effects that could be expected from the introduction of a post-grant review system in 
the US.  Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes. 
 
2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Litigation in the US  
In the United States, patent validity may be challenged after grant in two forums:  within the 
administrative agency (USPTO) or in the judicial branch (courts).  The administrative process 
most often used, the reexamination, is ex parte (giving the patentee exclusive rights to 
communication with the decision-maker) and substantially restricts the involvement of the 
challenger.  Graham et al. (2003) document the limited use, and usefulness, of the US 
reexamination proceeding, showing that only 0.3% of patents granted between 1991 and 1998 
were reexamined, and that patent owners initiated more than half of these reexamination 
requests.  A refinement of the procedure introduced in 1999, the inter partes reexamination, 
allows challengers more access, but creates such substantial disincentives to challengers that 
it is far less used in practice (Farrell and Merges, 2004).  As a result, litigation in the US 
Federal courts is the predominant mechanism used to challenge the validity of a patent.  
Moreover, as we will make plain, it is an extremely costly mechanism for parties to access.  
 5
Procedurally, US patent litigation is a full-blown adversarial proceeding in the US federal 
courts.  Activities include, but are not limited to investigation, preparing or answering the 
complaint and other documents, seeking to impose or prevent an injunction, motion practice, 
preparing expert witnesses, engaging in pre-trial discovery, jury selection, preparing 
demonstrative and human evidence, and trial.  Patent suits may arise from either infringement 
actions by the patentee, or "declaratory judgment" suits by a challenger seeking to invalidate 
the owner's patent.  Challengers are restricted in their ability to bring this latter type of case:  
in order to file such an action, there must be either an explicit threat or other action by the 
patentee that creates a "reasonable apprehension" on the part of the challenger that it will face 
an infringement suit from the patentee.  
The patent owner enjoys several strong advantages in federal lawsuits.  First, courts consider 
that a US patent is "born valid," and place the legal burden on challengers to prove patent 
invalidity.  Second, the burden of persuasion on the challenger is the heightened "clear and 
convincing" standard, a burden substantially higher than the mere "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard that is the rule in most civil cases.3  The costs that these burdens and 
barriers impose upon challengers are heightened because, in many circumstances, judges and 
juries have limited science and engineering training.  Judicial philosophy creates added costs:  
Allison and Lemley (1998) suggest that during the years after the creation of the specialized 
patent appellate court (the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1983), the rate 
of successful patent challenges fell from 50 percent to 33 percent. 
The patentee also enjoys timing and siting advantages over challengers.  In the case of an 
infringement lawsuit, the patent owner exerts de facto and de jure control over the timing of 
enforcement and litigation of the patent dispute.  In infringement actions, the patentee also has 
first choice of geographic venue, an important consideration when one considers the 
heterogeneity in decision-making displayed by judges and juries in the 94 different federal 
district courts across the United States.4  But even in "declaratory judgment" suits brought by 
challengers, the patentee exerts some control over timing.  Because the competitor must have 
a reasonable apprehension of an infringement action, such apprehension generally comes in 
the form of a demand from the patentee to cease infringement.  
Direct legal costs of a typical patent lawsuit are estimated to be $4 million US (AIPLA, 
2003), although Farrell and Merges (2004) show that, as more money is at risk in the suit, 
litigation costs rise sharply—mostly driven by discretionary spending in the "discovery" 
phase.  Another estimate puts the costs in patent litigation at $500,000 US per claim at issue, 
per side (Barton, 2000).  While evidence suggests that about 95 percent of patent suits end in 
settlement (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001b), settlement in the shadow of litigation is 
nonetheless time consuming and expensive.  Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001b) estimate 
time to settlement at 8 to 25 months, while Magrab (1993) estimates district court patent trials 
last 31 months.  Our data analysis of patent suits litigated between 1970 and 1987 support 
these figures:  While cases pend on average for 30.4 months, those cases settled or withdrawn 
last 18.7 months on average while those reaching a determination on directed, jury, or bench 
                                                 
3 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler quote a survey of federal judges who report that the preponderance standard is 
50% while the "clear and convincing" standard requires proof to a 60-70% certainty.  C. Jolls, C.R. Sunstein, 
and R. Thaler (1998).  "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics," Stanford Law Review, May:  1530-
1531. 
4 Patent lawsuits are governed by federal (United States) law, and thus trials must be originated in the federal 
trial-level courts, the "district courts."  Appeals must be heard at the Court of Appeals at the Federal Circuit, 
with discretionary appeals available at the US Supreme Court. 
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verdict last on average 39.2 months.5  Because surveys conducted by the AIPLA (2001) report 
that approximately half the estimated legal costs of litigation are incurred before the end of 
the discovery phase, and thus well prior to trial, litigation events, even if they end in 
settlement, involve substantial direct costs. 
In sum, litigation in the US federal courts appears to be costly, in terms of both legal barriers 
and direct and indirect costs, to challengers and owners alike.  These costs create a substantial 
disincentive to potential challengers of patents of questionable validity, particularly when the 
challengers are resource constrained.  Farrell and Merges (2004) suggest that federal court 
challenges occur less frequently than is optimal due to public goods and pass through 
problems.  Because an invalidity ruling has the character of a public good in that all the 
competitors of the patentee benefit, a coordination problem creates advantages to free riding, 
with the result that none steps forward to file suit and suffer the litigation costs.  Moreover, a 
pass-through problem arises because accused infringers may choose to forego the costs of 
challenging the patent and instead pass through to consumers the costs the patentee's demand 
for royalty payments, without regard to the validity of the patentee's claims.  Both create 
disincentives to challenge invalid patents, and may produce substantial welfare loss.   
The opposition has been advanced as a means of improving patent system design by reducing 
the incidence of litigation, reducing uncertainty, and improving patent quality (Hall, et al., 
2004; Farrell and Merges, 2004).  Because the US post-grant review proposals are based in 
large part upon the experience of European nations with "patent oppositions," we turn now to 
a discussion of the opposition proceedings available at the European Patent Office.   
 
2.2 Opposition at the European Patent Office 
This section reviews the institutional setup of patent oppositions and appeals at the EPO. 
European member states can obtain patent protection by filing several national applications at 
the respective national patent offices or by filing one EPO patent application at the European 
Patent Office. The EPO provides a supra-national application and granting procedure, 
allowing applicants' patents to attain the same legal status as patents granted by the various 
national offices in the EPC signatory countries. Any third party can oppose the European 
patent at the European Patent Office within nine months of a patent's grant by filing an 
opposition against the granting decision.  Opposition can be filed by any third party, but not 
by the proprietor of the patent, and its outcome is binding for all states in which the patent 
granted by the EPO has effect. If opposition is not filed within nine months after the grant, the 
patent’s validity can only be challenged under the legal rules of the respective countries in 
which the patent has been validated.  The EPO opposition procedure is the only centralized 
challenge process for European patents. Opposition may be filed on grounds listed in Art. 100 
EPC.  These are i) the subject matter is not patentable,6 ii) the patent does not disclose the 
invention sufficiently clearly or completely so that it can be carried out by a person skilled in 
the art, or iii) the subject matter of the European patent extends beyond the content of the 
original application.  A formalities officer first examines the filed opposition and can declare 
                                                 
5 These statistics are based on cases that were finalized in the same district court where the suit was filed. 
6 See EPC Art. 52-57. The invention is not patentable if a) the subject matter is not novel (Art. 52(1), 54 and 
55 EPC), b) it does not involve an inventive step (Art. 52(1), 56 EPC), c) it cannot be used in an industrial 
application (Art. 52(1) and 57 EPC), and d) it is not regarded an invention (Art. 57 EPC) or is not patentable 
according to Art. 53 EPC. 
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it inadmissible if a formal requirement is violated.  If found valid, an Opposition Division 
(OD) determines the outcome of the opposition case.7  The OD is a panel consisting of three 
technical examiners, two of whom must have taken no part in examining the opposed patent.  
If the case requires legal expertise, the OD panel may be enlarged by adding a legally 
qualified examiner.  In resolving the case, the OD will attempt to use only written 
proceedings (oral arguments are not required), but it may request as often as necessary written 
statements from the parties involved.  Any of the parties involved may request, or the OD 
may initiate, oral proceedings.8.  Furthermore, the OD may decide to search for new prior art 
material on its own initiative, thus rendering the OD both quasi-judicial (decisions) and quasi-
executive (investigation). 
Opposition proceedings at the EPO may have one of four possible outcomes.  First, the patent 
may be upheld without amendments, i.e., the opposition is rejected. Second, the patent may be 
revoked fully, and not longer be valid as a patent.9  Third, when amendments are proposed by 
the patentee, the patent may be maintained in amended form, a process that often takes the 
form of a negotiation between the parties, with the OD serving as mediator.10  Finally, the 
opposition procedure may be closed without a directly observable outcome.11  A "closed" 
opposition may occur if either (1) the opposition is withdrawn or (2) the patent is allowed to 
lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees. If the patent has lapsed in all EPC states in which it 
had effect after the grant, the opponent can request continuation of the opposition 
proceedings.12  If the opponent does not pursue this right, the opposition will be closed.  Thus, 
the interpretation of this outcome “opposition closed” is ambiguous ex ante. 
In Section 3 of this paper, we make reasonable assumptions about these outcomes and resolve 
to determine their meanings empirically by examining patent renewal data.  If patent renewal 
fees are being paid after the opposition has been closed, we assume that the opponent has 
withdrawn. If the payment of renewal fees ceases prior to the closing of opposition or just 
after the opposition has been filed, we assume that the proprietor has allowed the patent to 
lapse. The latter case (withdrawal by patent proprietor) appears to be about three times more 
likely than the former case in which the opponent withdraws.  We rely on these assumptions 
to generate some inputs to our welfare analysis. 
Another important aspect of the opposition procedure concerns the restrictions put on the 
opponent’s ability to settle “out of court.”  Once an opposition is filed, the EPO can choose to 
pursue the case on its own, even if the opposition is withdrawn.13  Thus, the opponent and 
patentholder may not be free to settle their case once the opposition is filed. This provision of 
the opposition likely discourages its strategic use by potential opponents interested in forcing 
patentholders to license their patents.  
Both the patentholder(s) and the opponent(s) may appeal the outcome of the opposition 
procedure.14  The appeal must be filed within two months after receipt of the decision of the 
                                                 
7 See EPO (2003, Part D, Chapter VI). 
8 Art. 116(1) EPC 
9 For the rules covering rejecting the opposition or revoking the patent, see Art. 102(1) EPC. 
10 See generally Art. 102(3) EPC. 
11 See EPC Rule 60(2) (2003, Part D, Chapter VIII). 
12 See EPC Rule 60(1) (2003, Part D, Chapter VIII). 
13 Rule 60 EPC: “In the event of the death or legal incapacity of an opponent, the opposition proceedings may 
be continued by the European Patent Office of its own motion, even without the participation of the heirs or 
legal representatives. The same shall apply when the opposition is withdrawn.” 
14 Article 99ff. EPC 
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OD, and must be substantiated within an additional two months.  Both parties can bring 
expert witnesses into the appeal proceedings, and there are various options for having 
deadlines extended.  The Board of Appeal affords the final opportunity at the EPO to test the 
validity of the contested European patent.  
The costs of opposition and appeal are typically born by each party.  However, the OD may 
deviate from this cost allocation under certain circumstances,15 in particular for “reasons of 
equity.” Equity applies when “the costs are culpably incurred as a result of irresponsible or 
even malicious actions,”16  which can then be charged to the party responsible.  Discussions 
with EPO staff indicate that this option is rarely used, so that in the vast majority of cases, the 
costs are born by each of the parties themselves.  The official fee for filing an opposition is 
613€; while the filing fee for an appeal is 1,022€.   
Interviews we conducted with European patent attorneys suggest, however, that the total costs 
to the opponent or the patentholder are much higher. Estimates of the total costs of an 
opposition range between 10,000€ and 25,000€ for each party.17  Our interviews  suggest that 
there are few opportunities for the opponent to drive up the patent owner’s costs, for two 
reasons: i) attorney fees are regulated in most European countries, including Germany, where 
many patent lawyers who have the required EPO registration reside; and ii) the institution of 
"discovery," a main cause of the high costs of US litigation, does not exist in the EPO 
opposition system.18  Our interviews also revealed that  apportionment rules under the EPC 
should also serve to discourage attempts to drive up the other party’s costs.19  In sum, the 
European opposition  has three important advantages in comparison to US litigation:  it is 
considerably less costly, opportunities for strategic manipulation of an adversary’s costs are 
more restricted, and limitations on settlement make opposition less attractive as an instrument 
to extort payments from the patent holder. 
 
3 Data Issues and Empirical Results 
3.1 Identification of Litigated US Patents - Sampling and Validation 
Information on the litigation history of United States patents has been difficult to collect.  
This difficulty is even more vexing when one considers the importance of patent litigation in 
the United States, the strategic opportunities it presents, and the ramifications it has for 
competition and industrial organization more generally.  Lack of data has substantially 
reduced the ability of researchers to study empirically questions related to patent litigation, 
and to the testing of patent validity more generally (Hall et al., 2004).  While there are notable 
                                                 
15 Art. 104 EPC 
16 EPO (2003, Part D, Chapter IX, 1.4) 
17 Mewburn Ellis LLP (http://www.mewburn.com/meepopf.htm, June 30th, 2004) give ranges between $5,000 
and $15,000 to prepare and file a Notice of Opposition for standard cases, and between $8,000 and $30,000 
for the subsequent correspondence and oral proceeding.   
18 Markus Herzog, a Partner at Weickmann & Weickmann, Munich, estimates the cost for each side to be 
€7,000 for the opposition and €10,000 for the appeal stage if the parties employ patent attorneys at the EPO’s 
location (i.e., without cost of travel).  He also notes that the parties have virtually no way of driving up their 
adversary’s costs.  In an updated interview March 2005, he put the costs of opposition in a range of €10,000 - 
€15,000.  (Conversations on Oct. 17, 2001 and March 10, 2005).   
19 EPC Art. 104. 
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exceptions in the literature (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 2001b; Somaya 2003), studies 
have nevertheless been few given the importance of the subject matter. 
Our study makes use of litigation data collected from the Litalert database that includes patent 
suits reported to the United States Patent and Trademark Office by the US District Courts 
since 1973.  We supplement these data with information supplied to the Federal Judicial 
Center by US courts made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research.  Our data contain over 32,000 individual litigation records and match to over 
25,500 US patents issued 1963-2003.  A thorough discussion of our validation of these data 
against earlier studies is included in Appendix A. 
As discussed in the appendix, our Litalert™ data appear to be a comprehensive sample of 
patents litigated in the United States 1963-2003, when one allows for the recorded 
underreporting of litigation events in the early years and right-side censoring due to patent 
cases having long lags when compared to patent application dates.  Our data correspond 
reasonably well to the data used in earlier studies (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 
2003) and indeed appear more comprehensive in several respects.  Because our data more 
accurately reflect patents litigated in the US during the 1990s-present, they are a more 
meaningful sample from which to draw conclusions about the effects of adopting a post-grant 
patent review in the United States. 
 
3.2 Creating a Matched Sample of US Patents 
This study compares European "equivalents" of litigated US patents (see section 3.3 below) 
with European “equivalents” of non-litigated (control group) US patents.  While it is typical 
in empirical patent studies to create a matched sample on application date and technology 
class, there are assignee identity characteristics in our US litigated patent sample that make a 
simple application year-technology class strategy inappropriate.  Consistent with Lanjouw 
and Schankerman (2001), our litigated patents are much more likely than the typical patent to 
be assigned to a domestic (US) organization, and much less likely to be assigned to a foreign 
(non-US) organization.  For all patents, the likelihoods that a patent will be unassigned, 
assigned to a US organization, or assigned to a non-US organization are 18%, 47% and 33% 
respectively, while for our litigated sample the likelihoods are 25%, 62%, and 11%, 
respectively.  To avoid selection problems arising from assignee characteristics, we matched 
our sample on four bases:  patent application year, 4-digit IPC technology class, nation of first 
inventor origin, and USPTO assignee code (1-7, as applied by the agency).20  Using this 
technique we were able to match in excess of 98% of our US litigated patents.  For those 
patents we could not match using this method, we reverted to the simple application year-
technology class method used in previous research (Graham et al. 2003). 
The advantage of using a sample of matching (presumably) non-litigated US patents21 and 
obtaining data on the respective equivalents is that this approach enables us to study 
differences in grant rates and in other procedural variables, such as time to grant, between 
equivalents of litigated and non-litigated US patents. In particular, we can determine whether 
                                                 
20 These assignee classifications are described in Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001). 
21 The sample was generated from all US patents not in our litigated sample.  Thus, we expect at most that 1% 
of our control group patents were litigated (following Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001), and more likely 
less. 
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the owners of US litigated patents are less likely to be granted European patents than owners 
of US control group patents. 
 
3.3 Identification of Patent Equivalents and Patent Families 
We extend earlier work by Graham et al. (2003) in identifying foreign related patents of our 
sample of US-granted patents.  This earlier study exploited a relationship between US and 
European (EPO) patents that can be best described as “family membership.”22 Because the 
differences between “equivalent” and “family” patents in this context are important, we 
consider them in more detail. 
Strictly speaking, patents are highly unlikely to ever be equivalent since the national laws 
determining the legal rights bestowed on patent owners will differ even if patents have exactly 
the same wording. An applicant seeking patent protection in various jurisdictions is faced 
with different patent laws and procedural practices.  If a US patent applicant seeks to obtain a 
patent at the European Patent Office, she typically will use a somewhat modified version of 
the US application and file this document within the priority year at the EPO or WIPO (World 
Intellectual Property Organization). If the applicant files a PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) 
application, the EPO will typically be the target office for US or international applicants.  In 
both the US and EPO system, a patent may claim priority documents other than the patent's 
own application.  These priority documents are important, having ramifications for "priority 
of invention" and also because strict rules govern the elapsed time during which applicants 
may secure protections in other patenting jurisdictions around the globe. 
Patent practitioners use at least three different classifications to characterize linkages between 
patent documents in different jurisdictions.  These linkages are based upon the priority 
documents to which patents in different jurisdictions claim benefit.  When matching a US 
patent to a non-US patent, we will follow convention and refer to the non-US patent matched 
under these different methods as an (1) equivalent, a (2) family patent, or an (3) extended 
family patent.  Figure 1 shows an example of our approach.23 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As our most conservative identification method, we will refer to patents as "equivalents" if 
they share exactly the same set of priority documents. Given a group of patents that share 
some priority documents (D1-D5 in Figure 1), only those that share exactly the same set of 
priority documents would be considered "equivalents" for our analysis.  In Figure 1, only two 
patent documents (D2 and D3) are equivalents because they are based on exactly the same set 
of priority documents (P1 and P2).  None of the other documents is equivalent with any other 
in the set.24  In our study, D2 could be a US patent document while D3 could be an EPO 
                                                 
22 We referred to these patents in the earlier paper as equivalents, but we use a different notation here which is 
more consistent with patent attorney practice.  
23 Our definitions and treatment follow the discussion of patent family relationships provided in  
http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/epidosnews/source/epd_4_00/14_4_00_e.htm. See also 
http://www.piug.org/patfam.html for a discussion of alternative approaches. 
24 We detail below that our matching the US litigated patents to their European (EPO) equivalents produce a 
reasonably limited share of patent counterparts – approximately 18%.  This figure differs substantially from 
the findings in Graham et al. (2003) where we used an extended definition of family relationship among 
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patent document.  Since they refer to the same set of priorities, we can identify these two 
documents D2 and D3 as equivalents. 
The identification methods used to collect a non-US "family" patent and "extended family" 
patent of a US document are less conservative than for "equivalents" in that we relax the 
requirement that exactly the same set of priority documents are required to produce a match.  
In the case of what we call a "family" patent of a US document, patents are matched when 
they have at least one priority document in common.  In Figure 1, documents D1, D2 and D3 
form a patent "family," since they have at least one priority in common (P1), while D2, D3 
and D4 also form a "family," as they have P2 in common.  Documents D4 and D5 also form a 
"family" based on the common priority P3. 
In the case of an "extended family" patent of a US document, matching is even less 
conservative:  members of an extended family are defined as the set of documents linked 
either directly or indirectly through common priority documents.  In Figure 1, all the 
documents D1, D2, D3, D4 and D5 belong to the same “extended family” —they are linked 
directly and indirectly through the common priorities P1, P2 and P3.  This definition is the 
least conservative because documents such as D5 and D3 (Figure 1) do not have a priority 
document in common, but they are linked by document D4 and priority P2.   
Information on European patents related to our given sets of US patents was obtained from 
the ESPACE database. ESPACE lists "equivalent" and "family" patents as defined above. The 
latter definition is also used in INPADOC data (which are incorporated into ESPACE). For 
our analysis using extended patent families, we rely upon the OECD Triadic Patent database 
to provide us with the non-US "extended family" patents for our US documents. The Triadic 
database is restricted to patent families that have family documents in all three major patent 
offices (EPO, JPO, and USPTO). Obtaining the members of the “extended family” without 
this geographic restriction requires data on the priorities of US and EP patents that are 
difficult to obtain. 
A summary of the results of our matching using the three different methods is presented in 
Table 1.  While we identified in the previous section 25,482 litigated US patents, only patents 
with US filing dates after 1976 can have an EP equivalent because the European Patent 
Convention was not in force prior. This date limitation leaves us with 18,033 litigated US 
utility patents and 18,033 matched US patents (obtained through stratified random sampling 
with replacement). Due to replacement, our group of matched patents contains a small 
number of multiples.25 
[Table 1 about here] 
For the 18,033 granted and litigated US patents, we were able to identify 3,424 equivalent EP 
applications. In some cases, a US patent has several equivalents—the 3,424 EP patent 
applications are related to 3,342 non-identical US patents. For the 18,033 granted and 
matched (control group) US patents, we identified 3,328 equivalent EP applications (on 3,206 
US patents). Thus, the likelihood of finding one or more equivalents is only slightly higher for 
the presumably more valuable group of litigated patents.  For both groups, the probability of 
                                                                                                                                                        
patents. As we show later in this paper, although the definitions are quite different, very similar results with 
respect to the opposition propensity emerge. 
25 There are 104 duplicates, 2 triplicates and 2 quadruples. 
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finding an equivalent is low (19.0 and 18.5 percent for litigated and control group patents, 
respectively). 
Generating a control group of US patents allows us to extend our analysis beyond the 
workings of the opposition procedure. In particular, we can employ our controls to observe 
whether litigated and non-litigated (control) patents have the same likelihood of having an 
EPO equivalent (or related family members).26  But doing so comes at some hazard:  it is 
important to note that while we have matched the US patent pairs with EP patent applications, 
we do not necessarily have corresponding EP application pairs (or pairs of granted patents) 
for all US pairs.  
These differences are important for the interpretation of our descriptive statistics. For the 
purpose of our comparisons, we have to distinguish between four types of equivalent EP 
patent applications: 1) EP patent applications that are equivalents to US litigated patents, but 
without a paired EP patent application that is equivalent to the (paired) US non-litigated 
patent; 2) applications equivalent to US litigated patents for which an equivalent to the 
(paired) US non-litigated patent exists; 3) the group of applications being equivalent to US 
control group patents and having matching EP observations in group 2); 4) a group of EP 
applications equivalent to US control group patents, but without a matching EP equivalent to 
the paired litigated patent. It is clear that groups 2) and 3) allow for the most reliable 
controlled comparison, but the matched pairs in this comparison are the result of consecutive 
selection effects. In particular, we expect that patents in groups 2) and 3) are more valuable 
than other patents because the likelihood of being in this sample is conditional on the 
existences of an equivalent for the litigated and the existence of an equivalent of the control 
group patent. This probability may be high in technical fields in which patents are particularly 
valuable or have global reach, and so create incentives patent applicants to file both in the US 
and in Europe. 
Table 1 also lists the numbers of EPO documents that are not equivalents, but are related to 
our US litigated patents and the patents in the control group. Selecting all “relatives” of our 
US patents, we identify 7,728 EPO applications that are related to our 18,033 litigated patents, 
and 7,045 EPO “relatives” of the 18,033 non-litigated patents comprising our control group. 
The ratio of identified EPO applications to US patent documents is higher for the litigated US 
patents (42.9%)27 than for the control group patents (39.1%). While this difference suggests 
that owners of more valuable patents (which are also more likely to be litigated) are seeking 
protection in Europe more often, it may simply reflect the fact that owners are filing more 
applications in support of a core invention than for less valuable patents. 
Because our sample of litigated patents (N=18,033) differs in important characteristics from 
the population of all granted US patents, we also explored the hypothesis that our litigated-
and-equivalent sub-sample (N=3,342) differs from the entire sample of litigated patents.  We 
find that there are only small (yet significant) differences in the distribution of primary 
                                                 
26 Jensen et al. (2006) use the OECD Triad Patent Family Database to study examination outcomes at the 
USPTO, JPO and EPO. Our approach makes some of the selection effects transparent that they do not 
consider. 
27 This figure is consistent with the Graham et al. (2003) findings for EPO matches to US patents in 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies, semiconductors, and computers. 
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international-patent classes.28  In terms of assignee identity, the likelihoods that a litigated and 
equivalent patent will be unassigned, assigned to a US organization, or assigned to a non-US 
organization are 15%, 62% and 21% respectively.  These shares more closely represent the 
overall population of granted patents in terms of unassigned and foreign organization-
assigned patents than does the litigated sample, although the share of US organization-
assigned patents is substantially higher, in line with the litigated sample.29 
 
3.4 Examination and Opposition Process Outcomes for EP Relatives of US 
Litigated and US Control Group Patents 
Table 2 presents a first set of comparisons between EPO patent applications. The four 
columns represent the different groups of “equivalent” applications (as defined in section 3.3). 
In the subsequent discussion, we first focus on the comparison of columns 2 and 3. The 
comparison of unpaired equivalents in groups 1 and 4 confirms our results, but due to 
differential selection effects, the statistics differ between group 1 and 2, and group 3 and 4, 
respectively.  
[Table 2 about here] 
We first study the examination outcomes in Europe. We find that the EP grant rate is 
considerably higher for the equivalents of litigated patents than for twins of the control 
groups. In our paired comparison, 80.3 percent of equivalents of litigated patents achieve a 
patent grant, 15 percent are withdrawn or refused, and 4.8 percent are still pending (column 
3). The grant rate for equivalents of non-litigated US patents is 67.9 percent, 27.4 percent are 
withdrawn or refused, and 4.7 percent are still pending. In the unpaired comparison between 
columns 1 and 4, the grant rates are 68.9 and 59.9 percent, but about 9 percent of examination 
cases are still pending. 
This finding confirms that the outcomes of patent examination cannot be taken as a simple 
indicator of patent quality. The decision to pursue an application is the result of complex 
tradeoffs between patent scope and patent value. For an economically important invention, a 
patent holder may be willing to accept even a highly restricted patent (low scope) while for an 
economically unimportant one, the patent holder may simply withdraw the application.30 
Applicants with valuable patents can be expected to put more effort into securing a patent 
grant (even if the claims are narrowed by the examiner during the give-and-take of the 
examination process).  For our control group, the grant of a narrowed version may no longer 
be economically attractive and thus applicants may be more willing to abandon the 
prosecution instead of expending more resources in the patent-seeking process. 
                                                 
28 Distributions for primary international classes A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H are as follows, for Litigated sample and 
(Litigated & Equivalent sub-sample), in percents:  24.3(23.5); 22.2(21.3); 6.7(8.5); 1.0(1.1); 5.1(3.0); 
7.8(6.4); 19.5(21.4); 13.4(14.8).   
29 In the overall population (and litigated sample), for unassigned, assigned to a US organization, and assigned 
to a non-US organization, respectively:  18%(25%); 47%(62%); and 33%(11%). 
30 Discussions with German patent attorneys confirm this view.  “Examiners may be uninformed, or too 
generous.  Patent applicants can make it very difficult for examiners to say ‘No.’  I have seen incidents in 
which an examiner wants to refuse an application, but the applicant arranges a meeting with attorneys and 
technical experts – and the examiner is put under pressure and in the end allows the patent.  The patent may 
not be what the applicant wanted, but the applicant gets a patent nevertheless.”  Interview with Dr. Michael 
Wallinger, March 8, 2005. 
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Table 2 also contains information about a number of application characteristics. When 
compared to the equivalents of control-group patents, equivalents of litigated patents typically 
contain more claims and the search reports associated with these applications subsequently 
have a larger number of references to earlier patents. The search reports for equivalents of 
litigated patents also indicate a somewhat larger share of critical references of the X or Y type 
than for equivalents of control group patents. These lettered designations indicate that the 
search examiner at the EPO has found more damaging state of the art (backward citations). 
However, the differences are small and not always significant. 
When we consider the number of citations received by our equivalents, it is clear that 
equivalents of litigated patents (in columns 1 and 2) have about twice the number of citations 
than equivalents of non-litigated patents (in columns 3 and 4). Both comparisons yield highly 
significant test results. Moreover, the classification in the citing search reports indicates that 
equivalents of litigated patents are likely to establish higher hurdles for subsequent 
applications than equivalents of control group patents do. The share of X citations is 
significantly higher in column 2 than in column 3. The other comparisons (columns 1 and 4 
for share of X citations, and both comparisons for the share of Y citations) do not indicate 
significant differences. 
We continue our exploratory analysis by restricting attention to patent applications that 
yielded an actual patent grant. Table 3 mimics the structure of Table 2 in that the inner 
columns 2 and 3 allow again for a paired comparison while statistics for the unpaired cases 
are displayed in the outer columns 1 and 4.  We now change our focus to the likelihood of 
opposition and on opposition outcomes. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Given the higher grant rate for equivalents of litigated US patents, it is not surprising that the 
number of observations in column 1 is considerably larger than the size of the corresponding 
group in column 4. Our first result is that the time to grant (or grant lag) is significantly higher 
for the equivalents of litigated US patents. However, in the most reliable paired comparison, 
the difference is small (0.14 years).  
The most pronounced difference can be found in the opposition frequency statistic. 
Equivalents of litigated patents are about three times more likely than equivalents of non-
litigated patents to be challenged under opposition.  From our descriptive statistics, we cannot 
determine at this point whether the increased attack rate is due to the (presumed) higher value 
of patents represented in columns 1 and 2, or to the perception on the part of the challenger(s) 
that the targeted patent may be a particularly easy one to challenge (i.e., it promises a high 
success rate). 
Our outcome statistics help us to illuminate this question to some degree. Note first that the 
share of pending opposition cases is higher for the equivalents of litigated patents. Taking 
columns 2 and 3 as the basis of our comparison, we note that the grant lag did not differ 
substantially, and yet the construction of our pairs should adequately control for application 
year effects. Hence, the opposition proceedings for the patents described in column 2 appear 
to consume more time than for those described in column 3. Again, this finding is likely the 
result of endogenous effort allocation—parties will fight harder to maintain (or destroy) 
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particularly valuable patent rights. However, we can show that neglecting pending cases is 
harmless.31 
Considering the distribution of outcomes, we find one unexpected result in Table 3. A 
surprisingly large number of cases among opposed equivalents of litigated US patents end up 
with the opposition being closed, i.e., abandoned (14.7 percent in column 1 and 13.0 percent 
in column 2).  The respective comparison figures are significantly smaller, as is the share of 
this outcome in the population of opposition cases (5.3 percent, see Hall and Harhoff 2004, 
Table 2). Between 22.6 and 24.4 percent of litigation cases yield a revocation of the 
equivalent EPO patent, while the revocation rate is between 39.5 and 27.6 percent for control 
group cases. A naive interpretation of these data would imply that the revocation rate is 
significantly lower for the litigation group of equivalents. However, these "closed" cases may 
include those in which either the opponent withdrew from the proceedings or the owner 
withdrew (e.g., by no longer paying renewal fees). 
In order to explore this hypothesis, we investigate these cases in more detail and assigned 
each "closed" case to either a "rejection" (in cases where the opponent withdrew) or to 
"revocations" (when the patent holder allowed the patent to lapse).  We assign a patent to a 
"patent revoked or lapsed" outcome whenever we find no evidence that an equivalent was 
validated by a national office in any of the designated states. Conversely, we assign the 
outcome “opposition rejected or withdrawn” if the patent was validated and renewal fees were 
paid at any of the national offices. The results of an analysis of these reclassifications are 
shown in Table 3 as “opposition outcomes (consolidated).” 
Analysis after reclassification demonstrates that the revocation rates are now roughly equal 
between the equivalents of the litigated and control sample.  Nevertheless, more cases are 
amended for the equivalents of litigated patents than for those of matched patents in column 2 
and 3, and the litigation group has a somewhat lower revocation rate. One possible 
explanation of this finding is that patent-holders are seeking to maintain their "valuable" 
patents, even in a more narrowed form. One explanation for the increased share of 
“opposition closed” outcomes for matches to litigated patents is that patent holders seek to 
avoid an official invalidation by the EPO and prefer to drop the matter by instead allowing the 
patent right to lapse. 
The hypothesis that owners of litigated US patents exert considerable effort to keep their IP 
rights in force is also demonstrated by the difference in appeal rates.  In 52.0 percent of all 
opposition cases targeting EP equivalents of litigated US patents (weighted average of 50.7 
and 55.6 percent in columns 1 and 2), the patent owner appeals the outcome.  We find that 
only one third of all cases concerning equivalents of matched US patents enter an appeal 
phase (42.9 percent in column 3 and 26.9 percent in column 4, yielding a weighted rate of 
32.5 percent). 
Neglecting the differences between paired and unpaired EP equivalents, we present in Figure 
2 a graphical depiction of the differences between opposition rates for the EP equivalents of 
US litigated patents and equivalents for the control group. Cases pending in examination were 
excluded. While the overall opposition rate for the matches to US litigated patents is declining 
over time, the trend demonstrates that the opposition rate for equivalents of US litigated 
                                                 
31 When we restrict the data to include application years prior to 1990, the share of pending cases is almost 
zero, but the distribution of outcomes remains stable. 
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patents is substantially higher (on the order of 3:1)  than that of the equivalents of the control 
sample throughout 1981-2001.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
3.5 Examination and Opposition Process Outcomes for EP Relatives of US 
Litigated Patents and for EP Control Group Patents 
An alternative to matching US litigated patents with non-litigated US patents would be to 
create a match between equivalents of US litigated patents and suitably defined EPO patents. 
The advantage of this approach is that it conditions on characteristics of the European 
relatives of the US litigated patents. Hence, the differential selection effects that make the 
statistics in Table 3 and Table 2 hard to interpret would not disturb the comparison. 
To proceed along these lines, we maintained all 7,728 unique relatives (3,424 equivalents, 
1,248 family members and 3,138 members of the extended family) of our 18,033 US litigated 
patents. Using the population of EPO applications, we performed a random sampling of 
control patents (with replacement) using priority year, priority country, technology field and 
grant status as conditioning variables. Due to some missing data, we can include only 3,386 
equivalents of US litigated patents and their EP control group (instead of 3,424), and 4,286 
non-equivalent family members of US litigated patents and their EP control group (instead of 
4,304) in the comparison. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
This comparison provides a robustness check for the earlier results. The main insights from 
the comparison of the data in Table 3 and Table 2 are confirmed. EPO applications related to 
litigated patents are broader in scope (have more claims), contain more references to earlier 
patents, and receive more citations from subsequent patents than EP applications matched 
using the procedure described above. 
More importantly, these patents take longer to achieve a patent grant. They have an 
opposition rate that is about three times higher than in the control group, and the share of 
opposition cases effectively leading to revocation is slightly lower than for control group 
patents. These statistics support our hypothesis that holders of US patents litigated in the US 
may be exerting more effort to win a patent at the EPO.  Furthermore, opponents are attacking 
these patents in opposition even in the face of somewhat reduced chances of success ex ante. 
Finally, we confirm that the appeal rate for EP “incarnations” of US litigated patents is 
significantly higher than for control group patents.32  Thus, our main results hold irrespective 
of the chosen control group design. 
The differences in opposition rates, outcomes, and appeal rates between equivalents and non-
equivalent family members of litigated US patents point to what may be strategic applicant 
behavior.  Applicants perceiving high value in their patents may be tempted to complement 
the equivalent application with additional, auxiliary applications (non-equivalent family 
members).  We showed in Table 1 that the families of litigated US patents are larger than 
                                                 
32 We also performed a comparison of non-equivalent family members of the US litigated and the US control 
group patents. We consider that test more difficult to interpret as we lose most of the matching structure. 
However, leaving this caveat aside, we obtain results that are very close to the ones summarized in Table 5. 
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those of control group patents.  These family patents may not be as valuable as the sister 
litigated patent (they have lower citations and grant rates), but they are attacked more often 
and they appear to be more prone to be revoked, as is borne out in the data (see Table 5).  
Moreover, appeal rates confirm this view:  Among “equivalents” (which are our statistics 
suggest are more valuable), the appeal rate is higher than for the non-equivalent family 
members of litigated US patents. 
As the results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 show, litigated patents (and their European equivalents and 
family members) are characterized by higher citation counts than the control group patents.  
Theoretical arguments predict that valuable patents are more likely to be attacked in 
opposition (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004).  Furthermore, patent value and the likelihood of 
infringement are directly proportional, and therefore valuable patents can be expected to be 
involved in litigation cases with increased frequency.  We are interested in determining 
whether the opposition process is (principally) triggered by higher patent value, or whether 
these target patents are (also) selected because opponents identify them as likely candidates 
for revocation.  To clarify the difference, assume for a moment that settlement does not occur 
in opposition proceedings.33  Assume that an opponent will file an opposition if the expected 
benefit exceeds the cost of doing so.  Let p be the probability of revocation (we neglect 
amendments for the sake of brevity), V the gain from revocation to the opponent, and c the 
cost of opposition.  If pV > c, then the rival will file an opposition.   
We consider that patents may be opposed either because the likelihood of revocation is 
comparatively high, or because the value of the revocation is high to the opponent.34  Suppose 
that we transform this inequality by taking logarithms and add a normally-distributed error 
term to obtain ln p + ln V – ln c > ε.  We estimate this equation using a set of covariates used 
in Harhoff (2005) to control for patent value and costs.  We actually interpret all regressors 
used by Harhoff (2005) as value or cost indicators (some may be related more to p than V) 
and add dummy variables to identify EPO patents with equivalents or family members that 
were litigated in the United States. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The population for this analysis is defined as all EPO patent grants with US priority and grant 
years from 1980 (when the first EPO-examined patents were granted) through 2000, 
inclusive. We restrict ourselves to US-priority patents in order to avoid complications arising 
from selection effects. We restrict the actual sample further, since we lack covariates for our 
full sample of patent grants. We obtain a sample of 122,568 patents, of which 1,443 are 
equivalents to US litigated patens, and 1,126 are non-equivalent family members of US 
litigated patents. 
In column (1), we simply report the incremental opposition incidence of these two groups 
relative to the reference group (i.e., EPO grants not related to US litigated patents). In the 
reference group, the opposition rate is 5.98 percent. For the equivalents of litigated patents, it 
is 18.09 percent, and for non-equivalent patent family members, it is 22.74 percent. While 
these figures come from a subset of the patents analyzed in Table 5, they are nevertheless 
                                                 
33 Harhoff and Reitzig (2004, fn 24) report interview evidence that cases settled privately during the opposition 
period at the EPO constitute only 10 to 25 percent of patents that are actually opposed. This suggests that the 
selection of cases is mostly decided based on the potential opponent’s participation constraint.  
34 We do not consider whether this value is generated by the latent promise of the technology, or whether the 
opponent holds asymmetric stakes (Somaya, 2003). 
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quite close to the estimates presented above for the more complete samples. In column (2) we 
present the marginal effects of the litigation dummy variables from a probit regression that 
contains (a) grant year and (b) technical field dummy variables. The coefficients are within 
one standard error of the population mean effects tabulated in column (1). When we extend 
the specification using a broad set of variables related to patent value in column (3), we find 
that some of the variation is accounted for by these variables.  Controlling for the value 
correlates, we find that equivalents of US litigated patents are 6.92 percent more likely than 
other patents to be involved in opposition, and non-equivalent EPO family members are 9.02 
percent more likely to face opposition.  An important caveat is in order, however:  it is likely 
that the litigation status of the patents captures unobserved value components even when we 
control for observable value correlates (such as the variables listed in the note to Table 6). 
 
4 Empirical Implications 
Our findings strongly suggest that US litigated patents are more likely than are "average" 
patents to be candidates for post-grant review in jurisdictions where that review is available.  
We point out that the comparison is conservative because the European examination 
procedures are less permissive than those in the US patent system—upwards of 20 per cent of 
US litigated patents, and 30 per cent of non-litigated patents, are never awarded patent 
protection in Europe. Thus, we expect the twin of a US litigated patent to have been screened 
more carefully than the corresponding US patent. Our estimates of post-grant review 
likelihood are thus bound to be conservative, but a detailed assessment of the breadth and 
private value of these patents is currently beyond the scope of our paper.  We expect the 
actual post-grant review frequency in the US to be higher than in Europe as long as the 
respective costs are similar. 
The social welfare implications associated with our findings are substantial.  Even if we 
disregard the fact that EPO examination is resulting in a more precise delineation of patent 
rights (due to more strenuous examination), our findings show that roughly 19 to 24 percent 
(see Table 4) of the patents litigated in the US are likely candidates for post-grant review, and 
that about one third of these would be revoked outright.  The effective revocation rate is likely 
to be even higher:  Conversations with German patent attorneys who both prosecute patents 
and contest oppositions suggest that approximately 50 percent of "partial revocations" result 
in a patent that is substantially damaged.35  It thus appears that the mean impact of a "partial 
revocation" is likely to reduce the enforceability of the patent considerably. We suggest that 
the effect of the “partial revocation” would also lower the likelihood that such a patent could 
become a credible threat and would be used to initiate an infringement suit or to force 
competitors into socially inefficient “inventing-around” strategies.  
Our results allow us to generate some welfare calculations estimating the benefit that would 
flow to the United States from adopting a "post-grant review" procedure.  While this exercise 
can by definition produce at best an estimate, our calculation is based on underlying 
characteristics of the patent and that it is inherently conservative. 
                                                 
35 The comments of one expert are representative of these opinions:  "If 100 patents are opposed and all are 
adjudged as 'partially revoked,' approximately 25 will be left largely undamaged, 50 will have their validity 
substantially affected, and for 25 the result will be deadly."  Interview with Dr. Michael Wallinger, March 8, 
2005. 
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We propose to compute the welfare impact as follows. On the benefit side, we expect a 
reduction in the number of cases that will ultimately be litigated, because the post-grant 
review will act in many circumstances as a substitute for litigation.  Hence, the litigation costs 
for these patents will be saved.  Second, even if a patent is not litigated in the current US 
system, under a new low-cost review system, some patents will be opposed and again (as we 
show for the group of twins of non-litigated US patents), about one third of these non-litigated 
patents will be revoked.  We will assume that, absent post-grant review, allowing such patents 
to remain in force causes welfare losses, the result of excessive market power being allocated 
to the patent holder.  Naturally, the cost of post-grant review must be taken into account as 
well. 
Our first term, estimating the benefit from saved litigation expenses, can be written as 
follows. Let P be the number of patents granted in a given year and pL be the probability of 
litigation in the current system. The probability of post-grant review for litigated patents is 
denoted pO,L, and pR,L is the probability of revocation of litigated patents in post-grant review. 
We will assume that 50 percent of the patents that are partially revoked are the equivalent of 
“revoked” patents, consistent with the testimony of experts in this field.  pPR,L is the probability 
of partial revocation in post-grant review for litigated patents. The average social cost of 
litigation is denoted SL. 
(1.1) LLPRLRLOL SpppPpW ⋅+⋅⋅⋅= )5.0( ,,,1  
The computation of the welfare gain from revoking or partially revoking patents that bestow 
excessive market power on patent holders can be written as 
(1.2) NLNLPRNLRNLOL SpppPpW ⋅+⋅⋅⋅−= )5.0()1( ,,,2  
where pO,,NL is the probability of post-grant review for non-litigated patents, pR,NL is the 
probability of revocation in post-grant review for non-litigated patents, pPR,NL is the  
probability of partial revocation in post-grant review for non-litigated patents, and SNL is the 
social cost originating from patent market power awarded in error. 
Finally, the cost of the post-grant review system can be written as 
(1.3)  ))(()1())(( ,,,, ANLAONLOLALAOLOL CpCpPpCpCpPpC ⋅+⋅⋅⋅−+⋅+⋅⋅⋅=  
where pA,L is the probability of appeal in post-grant review for litigated patents (conditional on 
post-grant review), pA,NL is the probability of appeal in post-grant review for non-litigated 
patents (conditional on post-grant review), CO is the average cost of post-grant review, and CA 
denotes the average cost of appeal following a post-grant review. 
These calculations of the potential societal savings from reducing litigation (1.1), the societal 
savings from reducing the maintenance of unwarranted patent monopolies (1.2), and the 
societal costs of running a post-grant review process (1.3) allow us to arrive at more precise 
estimates than have been available to date. We tabulate the results of our calculations in Table 
6. All columns take the opposition and outcome frequencies from our findings presented in 
Table 5 (equivalents, outcome after reassignment of closings, weighted averages of columns 
(1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4)).  
[Table 6 about here] 
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In our benchmark scenario 1, the estimate of the probability of litigation is taken from Allison 
et al. (2003) as 32 suits per 1000 patents.  Alternatively, we use the more conservative 
probability given by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) as 10.1 cases per 1000 in scenario 2.  
For the cost of litigation, we use the value of $4 million as reported by the AIPLA (2003). 
Because we are aware that very few cases reach the verdict stage, we also use an alternative 
(and conservative) assumption, allowing litigation costs to be as low as $2 million.  As we 
outline below, however, the litigation cost assumption is not the primary driver of the overall 
cost-benefit ratios. 
Our calculations require us to assess the social costs of non-litigated, but objectively invalid, 
patents.  Hall et al. (2003) estimate a conservative average welfare loss of $2 million for cases 
in which the patent is not litigated, but questionable. They employ value estimates from 
Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel (2003) of 4.4 million DM (in 1977) for patents that survived 
opposition.  Allowing for annual 4 percent growth, we assume such opposed patents will be 
worth (in 2006 terms) 3.5 million Euros.  We assume that patents which could have been, but 
were not, challenged and revoked in opposition will impose the same welfare loss from 
monopoly power, which, with linear demand and constant marginal costs, is equal to one half 
of the monopoly rents.36  In order to explore the sensitivity of our results we assume three 
different states of the world, with welfare losses alternatively of $4, $2, and $1 million.  We 
use our estimated $4 million figure in scenarios 1, 2, 5, and 8, a conservative $2 million figure 
in scenarios 3, 6, and 9, and in scenarios 4, 7, and 10 we employ a very conservative estimate 
of $1 million. 
In order to obtain our estimates, we must also make an assumption regarding the cost of post-
grant review. Given that the likelihood of post-grant review and of appeal is likely to be a 
function of costs (assuming that the demand for post-grant review is elastic with respect to 
price), it would be unwise to deviate far from the actual cost situation at the EPO. Somewhat 
conservatively, we estimate the total opportunity cost of post-grant review to be $100,000 US, 
an amount greater than actual EPO costs.  For the appeal, we use this same cost figure, an 
assumption that appears justified given the experience at the EPO (see footnote 10).   
The calculations in scenarios 1-4 are based on these reasonable estimates of the costs to 
parties of engaging in the post-grant review.  While our estimates of these costs are predicated 
upon what we consider the best available proxy measure—the actual cost of European 
opposition proceedings—other commentators have used higher costs estimates.  Levin and 
Levin (2003) use a figure of $500,000, but admit that their figure is conservative (high) given 
that the average European opposition costs considerably less.  To demonstrate the impact of 
substantially higher costs and to test the sensitivity of our results, we allow the costs for both 
opposition and appeal to be $200,000 in scenarios 5, 6 and 7, while we employ the very 
conservative estimate from Levin and Levin (2003) of $500,000 in scenarios 8, 9 and 10. 
Since scenarios 7 and 10 also use the lower bounds for litigation costs and social losses due to 
unwarranted, but unlitigated patents, the lowest benefit-cost ratios will occur in these “worst 
cases.” 
                                                 
36 From survey evidence, Harhoff et al. reported that patents renewed full-term were worth 400,000 DM on 
average, and through estimation determined that patents surviving opposition were worth 11 times more.  
Adopting this figure and the constant foreign exchange rate of 2 DM = 1 Euro, we calculate (4.4 million DM 
= 2.2 million Euro) and (2.2 million Euro * 1.04^30 = 7.1 million Euro).  Using the standard assumptions 
outlined above to calculate the deadweight loss, one-half of this value is approximately 3.5 million Euros of 
social cost for each opposed patent in our analysis.  
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When considering the outcomes summarized in Table 6, two results are particularly 
noteworthy.  As in previous work described in Hall et al. (2003), the overall benefit cost ratios 
are sizeable and range in scenarios 1-4 between 4.0 and 15.6.  We comment on the sensitivity 
of these estimates below. Second, and somewhat unexpectedly, a considerable share of the 
total net welfare gain WNET comes from revocations in post-grant review of presently non-
litigated patents.  Given the high cost of litigation, a large number of patents that would be 
challenged in an inexpensive post-grant review system are not litigated in the current system. 
Carrying these patents in the system is likely to have considerable negative welfare 
consequences, insofar as they entitle the patent owner to excessive market power and may 
trigger costly “invent-around” expenditures by competitors. A post-grant review system that 
offers a comparatively low-cost challenge may have a higher likelihood of identifying such 
patents, and our analysis shows that approximately one third of these patents will be revoked 
and one third substantially narrowed if the situation unfolds in a manner similar to the 
European setting. 
Naturally, the above estimates hinge critically on a variety of assumptions.  Moreover, simply 
transferring the empirical probabilities from Europe to the US may not yield plausible results 
if the underlying cost structure and institutional setup of a future US post-grant review system 
deviate strongly from this framework. However, as our results show, changes in the actual 
litigation rate and costs in the US does not change the results dramatically, since overall social 
benefit will be largely determined by the welfare effects emanating from those cases that are 
not being litigated under the current legal framework.   
This finding, that the overwhelming benefit from adopting an opposition system is likely to 
come from revoking invalid patents that are currently being missed by US court litigation, is 
an interesting aspect that has not been considered in detail in the current debate.  The small 
difference in benefit-cost ratios for scenarios 1 and 2 are illustrative of this point (15.5 versus 
15.6), and hold generally for the other scenarios we tested, thus leading us to report in Table 6 
scenarios 2-10 only the more conservative results (i.e., the lower benefit-cost ratio produced 
by employing the 1% litigation rate assumption).  One may argue that the favorable cost-
benefit ratios depend crucially on the assumed welfare loss from errant market power. While 
such an argument is doubtless correct, it is only when we assume an implausibly low welfare 
loss per case of non-litigated, but erroneously granted patents (with opposition in Europe) of 
$440,000 (in scenario 1) and of $150,000 (in scenario 2), respectively, that the two sources of 
welfare gains (represented by W1 and W2) are on par with respect to their absolute net effects.  
Even in this case, the benefit-cost ratios for the overall post-grant review system would be at 
3.1 in scenario 1 (litigation rate of 3.2%), but does drop near unity at 1.1 in scenario 2 
(litigation rate 1%). 
Both Hall et al. (2004) and Levin and Levin (2003) identified high opposition costs as the 
factor that would most likely erode social welfare in any changed US system.  Accordingly, 
we treat opposition (and appeal) costs as a shift variable in scenarios 5-10 and test the 
sensitivity of our overall results by allowing these costs to climb to $200,000 (scenarios 5-7) 
and $500,00 (scenarios 8-10).  These higher costs have the effect of increasing the sum of our 
equation (1.3) by a factor of 2 and 4.5, respectively, when compared to the baseline 
calculations (at a litigation rate of 1%) in scenarios 2-4.  As a result, our scenarios 5-7 show 
overall benefit-cost ratios lowered by a factor of 2 (as compared to scenarios 2-4) while these 
same ratios in scenarios 8-10 are decreased by a factor of 4.5 (as compared to scenarios 2-4).  
Only when we assume a very low welfare loss per case of non-litigated, but erroneously 
granted patents of $1 million, coupled with very conservative opposition and appeal costs of 
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$0.5 million (in scenario 10), do our calculations show a cost-benefit ratio smaller than unity 
(0.8). 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper is the first of which we are aware that compares US litigated patents with their 
European "equivalent" patents.  We demonstrate several novel methods of "twinning" US and 
European patents that may be used in empirical comparative international research.  Our data 
collection, identification, and analyses enable us to investigate the implications of employing 
these different twinning methods in our data analysis.  We are furthermore able to draw some 
powerful conclusions about the propriety of adopting a patent "post-grant review" in the 
United States. 
Our analysis suggests that even the most valuable US patents, those that are inviting costly 
litigation in US courts, are not being granted EPO patent protection in about 20 percent of the 
cases.  While some of this effect may be due to the different manner in which patentable 
subject matter is defined in the EPO (in software, for instance), higher quality standards at the 
EPO may also be playing a filtering role.  Our evidence thus lends support to proposals in the 
patent reform movement to provide funding and quality control to USPTO examination 
processes. 
More provocatively, our analysis and welfare calculations suggest that the benefit from post-
grant review in terms of social welfare per year—when put in dollar terms—could be over 
$20 billion.  The main parameter affecting this estimate is not savings on the cost of litigation, 
but the social costs of currently unlitigated patents that bestow excessive market power on 
some applicants.  This market power either allows the patentee to extort licensing fees, or 
force competitors to “invent around” the respective patent.  But even when we draw a 
conservative scenario, and assume a very low social cost figure of $1 million on average for 
these patents, our benefit-cost ratios still indicate that the benefits of such an institution 
compares very favorably to its costs.  Only when we drive the social costs of opposition and 
appeal to a high figure of $0.5 million (each), and couple these with extreme (low) estimates 
for the cost of market power and litigation do the overall social costs significantly outweigh 
the benefits. 
This latter point deserves particular attention. It is likely that any radical increase in the cost 
of post-grant review will alter our benefit calculations substantially (as shown in scenarios 5-
10), not only by inflating the cost-side of the benefit equation, but also (to the extent that the 
demand for post-grant review is elastic with respect to price) by depressing the benefit that 
would flow from removing patents that bestow excessive market power.  Several scenarios we 
have modelled demonstrate that radically higher post-grant review costs—on the order of the 
$500,000 used by Levin and Levin (2003)—would result in a cost-benefit ratio near, and in 
some circumstances less than, unity.  As demonstrated in Hall, et al. (2004), it is likely that 
any welfare benefits that flow to society will be quickly eroded by a high-cost post-grant 
review procedure.   
Not only should the system avoid burdening a patentee with substantial costs, but also 
because the system is designed to take advantage of information that resides with the 
patentee’s competitors about patent prior art, the process should avoid erecting cost barriers to 
them.  This latter problem is particularly important given the “public good” nature of an 
invalidity decision:  To the extent that the cost of such an invalidity outcome is increasing, the 
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incentives for potential challengers to “free ride” may rise, with the result that fewer worthy 
challenges will likely be brought. Our results thus contain an important reminder to policy-
makers: costs of post-grant reviews need to be kept relatively low in order to achieve the 
intended improvement in patent system performance. 
A number of important objections might be raised against the way in which we have set up 
the welfare calculations and the overall analysis. These are i) that we underestimate the 
impact that the introduction of post-grant reviews might have on smaller entitities and 
independent inventors who may become the target of larger firms in opposition proceedings, 
ii) that we neglect any form of type-II error cases in which patents are revoked that should be 
held valid, and iii) that we underestimate the danger of introducing an instrument that would 
be a precursor to, and a cause of more litigation rather than a substitute for litigation. We 
address these concerns in turn before addressing an additional issue—the role of courts in 
validating the decisions made by the post-grant review boards. 
Underestimated negative impact on smaller entities. It has been argued that smaller firms 
and individuals would find themselves the targets of opposition and would be disadvantaged, 
to the extent that these entities have limited resources.  A somewhat different, but related 
concern addresses the extent to which smaller entities engage in opposition.  Since the ex post 
validity of unchallenged patents is always uncertain (Lemley and Shapiro 2004), smaller 
entities might use the post-grant challenge less often than is optimal if the institution 
imposes—with certainty—high costs.  The system would consequently fail to incorporate the 
useful information about (in)validity that these smaller entities possess. However, these points 
raise the concern that a high-cost opposition mechanism may have disadvantages going 
beyond the ones we have captured with our welfare analysis. 
In the European low-cost opposition system, these issues are apparently not a serious 
impediment for small entities. We queried the German patent attorneys we interviewed 
specifically about such a “small entity” effect.  It was clear from our respondents, however, 
that individuals and small firms—instead of being disadvantaged by an opposition system—
are instead advantaged.  The much lower cost of purchasing a challenge (in comparison to 
full-fledged litigation) is seen as a substantial benefit to smaller entities.  We conclude that 
because the costs of litigation create a significant disincentive to small firms seeking 
invalidation in patent litigation (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997), a post-grant review offers the 
prospect of helping, not harming, small entities on balance. We also note that the results of 
two studies covering particular technologies have suggested that independent inventors are 
less, not more likely to see their patents become the target of opposition (Harhoff and Reitzig 
2004, Graham et al. 2003). Harhoff (2005) uses data covering a broad range of technology 
classes and confirms that EPO patents owned by independent inventors are less likely to be 
attacked. However, the results also suggest that firms with large patent portfolios have an 
advantage in avoiding patent opposition.  
All of these effects (to the extent that they are also present in the EPO system) are already 
included in our estimates. Hence, the concerns raised in the U.S. would only render our 
estimates suspect if the U.S. incarnation of a post-grant opposition system would create 
particularly strong detrimental effects. As we argued before, limiting the cost of a post-grant 
review mechanism is likely to be the best safeguard against such dangers. 
Type-II errors in post-grant reviews. Another objection against our study, and against our 
welfare calculations in particular, could focus on the absence of any consideration of type-II 
errors that would lead to the erroneous revocation of patents that should have been upheld in 
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opposition, but were not. Such errors would constitute the source of additional welfare losses. 
While our study design can inform us about type-I errors (the likelihood with which the US 
system maintains patents that, according to a European standard, should have been revoked), 
it is difficult to think of a data-generating process that would let us estimate the extent of 
type-II errors. However, it is quite clear that the overall design of modern patents systems 
generates a playing field that is tilted in favor of the applicant rather than the examiner or 
patent office, i.e., very much in favor of type-I errors. In the context of the European patent 
system, applicants have recourse to various forms of appeal, for example against the negative 
outcome of examination or of opposition. Moreover, in the US reform proposals, parties 
involved in the planned USPTO post-grant reviews would be entitled to appeal decisions to 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). We also note that in all reform debates 
in the US, the focus has clearly been on the permissive character of the system, rather than its 
tendency to deny patent grants to applicants. 
Opposition as a cause of litigation. It has been suggested that adopting an opposition 
mechanism in the US could actually increase the incidence of litigation, thus leading to an 
increase in the costs to patentees and altering the ex ante likelihood of patenting and the 
rewards to innovation.  Court proceedings occur when legal controversies fail to settle 
(Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997).  The law and economics literature has developed three theories 
to explain why disputes fail to settle, titled divergent expectations, asymmetric information, 
and asymmetric stakes (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989; Meurer, 1989).  Generally: divergent 
expectations between the parties lead to litigation because subjective probabilities of success 
in the suit differ; asymmetric information over likely outcomes drives litigation because of the 
possibility of capturing information rents; and a party's asymmetric stakes in the controversy 
increases litigation because the party is willing to invest resources in litigation, even in the 
face of a low likelihood of prevailing.   
Assuming an opposition system is well-tuned and produces correct results, opposition results 
would tend to lower uncertainty, and would be observable to all.  The outcomes in such a 
system would tend to undermine the divergent expectations and asymmetric information 
explanations for litigation, but would be less likely to limit cases driven exclusively by 
asymmetric stakes. 
Patent controversies arise from the actions of (at least) two parties, and are determined by the 
aggressiveness (willingness) of patent owners to enforce and the aggressiveness (willingness) 
of non-owners to infringe.  The willingness of either party can be expected to be a function of 
their certainty over the validity of the patent.  From either party's perspective, the information 
contained in an opposition outcome will tend to increase the likelihood of an efficient bargain 
absent sufficiently asymmetric stakes.  While an outcome increasing the owner's certainty 
about the validity of the patent right is likely to increase the willingness of the owner to 
enforce the patent, this result is satisfactory.  In our system, society has accepted a quid pro 
quo and seeks in policy to reward true inventiveness with monopoly.  While the patentee may 
demand payments from the infringer which are passed to consumers, or even put the infringer 
out of business, society understands this outcome and (in law) accepts it as part of an effective 
patent system—so long as the patentee has a valid patent.  To the extent that an opposition 
system can improve the certainty that the owner, the infringer, and society have over the 
validity of the patent, it may lead to efficient settlement, less litigation, and greater public 
legitimacy (considering the public as a consumer of news about the operation of the patent 
system). 
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This analysis suggests that high-quality opposition outcomes may tend to undercut two of the 
theorized causes of litigation, divergent expectations and asymmetric information (though not 
necessarily asymmetric stakes).  But we also suggest that owners will be more willing to 
enforce patents against infringers when receiving an opposition outcome that increases their 
certainty over the (heightened) validity of the property right.  Whether this willingness on the 
part of owners to enforce would lead to more litigation, however, is far from certain. 
Are oppositions that result in either an amended or survived patent likely to lead to more, or 
less, ex post litigation?  We must consider two endogenous reactions.  When an opposition 
results in an amended patent or a rejection of the challenge, one can expect two countervailing 
effects.  In amendments that undermine the validity of the patent, we expect this information 
about the weakening of the patent to create less incentive in the patentee to enforce, but also 
more incentive in the potential infringer to infringe.  More or less litigation may result ex post.  
Similarly, a patent that has survived opposition unscathed can be considered stronger, and 
thus may create incentives for the patentee to be more aggressive in enforcement, but may 
create incentives in infringers (who have not made sticky investments) to move away from 
infringing activity.  We may thus see again more or less litigation ex post.  While teasing out 
these effects is beyond the scope of our paper, we believe that providing our probit analysis in 
Table 5 offers some descriptive value and offer them as such. 
It has also been suggested that challengers might be reluctant to file oppositions because 
doing so would invite retribution in the form of an infringement action by the patentee—the 
so-called "painting a big red target on yourself" argument.  Leaving aside the fact that current 
proposals would allow challenges to be brought to the Patent Office through an intermediary, 
the consensus among the small sample of German attorneys we interviewed was that such 
outcomes did not occur.  In order to explore this issue quantitatively, we collected data on the 
incidence of patent annulment suits at the German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht 
- BPG). Since about 98% of all EPO patent grants designate Germany as a country in which 
patent protection is sought, the restriction to German court outcomes is not critical for our 
analysis. The BPG made available to us data on all 804 cases concerning EPO-granted patents 
that came to a decision between 1992 and 2003. Annulment suits can be initiated by third 
parties at any time during the statutory term of a patent, once opposition rights have been 
exhausted. These cases may be filed in the context of an infringement suit, but can also be 
filed independently. The data allow us to compute a litigation rate for opposed and for 
unopposed patents. Between 1986 and 1995 (a ten-year time window) a total of 269,760 
patents which designated Germany were granted by the EPO. Oppositions were filed against 
7.5% of these (20,150 patents). In 6,160 cases, the opposition was rejected (or withdrawn), 
and in 6,680 cases the patent had been amended. 7,280 patents had been revoked. Thus, 
97.3% of the patents (262,480 – 249,610 without preceding, 12,870 with preceding 
opposition) “survived” the opposition stage and were thus a potential target of annulment 
suits. Annulment suits had been filed against 683 patents, 198 of which had been the target of 
an opposition prior and 485 which had not. Thus, annulment suits occurred for 0.19% of all 
unopposed patents, and for 1.54% of the previously opposed patents. The overall annulment 
suit incidence was 0.26% of all patents that had survived the opposition stage. 
The most conservative (and somewhat unrealistic) assumption would be that opposition 
“caused” the difference in litigation rates between previously unopposed and opposed patents. 
This assumption is unrealistic because opposed patents concern particularly valuable 
inventions which are more likely to trigger infringement (and thus annulment suits, 
irrespective of a preceding opposition case). But even if we disregard this effect, in the case of  
German patents the revocation of 7,280 patents in opposition would have been accompanied 
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by a (hypothetical) rise of 198 cases in the number of annulment suits. Thus, this is clearly a 
second-order effect.  Moreover, while the impact of opposition on litigation may cause 
additional costs, it is unlikely that the effect is fully detrimental. If opposition “hardens” 
legitimate patent rights, subsequent infringement litigation may very well support R&D 
incentives in a socially efficient manner, contrary to cases in which patents are involved that 
are objectively invalid, and thus should not have been granted in the first place. 
We conclude that the three issues discussed above do not appear to be of major concern. They 
may indeed introduce second-order effects that could be considered in more detail, albeit at 
the expense of a considerably more complex analysis which we do not pursue here. Some of 
the concerns are likely to become more serious issues in the context of a high-cost post-grant 
review system. Thus, our discussion emphasizes the earlier point that post-grant reviews need 
to be “inexpensive” in order to bring about the desired positive consequences. 
At the conclusion of this discussion we comment on one additional concern that would indeed 
threaten the functional effect of any post-grant review system.  Under US law, the 
determinations of an administrative proceeding are due a review by the judicial branch, and 
thus the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) will likely play a role in controlling 
costs.  Evidence suggests that the CAFC has not been deferential to the validity 
determinations of district court judges: while the reversal rates in the Courts of Appeal in all 
civil matters is approximately 10%, the CAFC reverses 50% of the district court validity 
decisions (Chu, 2001).  This practice in the CAFC has the effect of shifting substantial costs 
to the litigating parties.  An over-active reversal posture toward the determinations of post-
grant review would have the effect of raising the likelihood of appeals, of raising the costs of 
the process, and of eroding the welfare benefits we have demonstrated in our calculations.  
Quillen (2005) criticizes the post-grant review proposals for this particular reason, arguing 
that without raising the standards of patent examination and review in the US courts, an 
opposition system would not be able to contribute to an improved overall patent system.  It is 
partly for this reason that previous studies offered a menu of recommendations for patent 
system reform, recognizing that these reforms operate together as a system (The National 
Academies, 2004; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).  Because a post-grant review system is mentioned 
prominently in these reports, we offer our study to allow more informed debate about the 
propriety of adopting such a change. 
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Figure 1 
Family Relationships between Patent Documents 
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Source: http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/epidosnews/source/epd_4_00/14_4_00_e.htm 
 
 
Figure 2 
EPO Opposition Frequency for Equivalents of  
Litigated and Control Group Patents 
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Appendix A 
As a validity check, we benchmarked our data against the results reported from data used in 
two prominent studies of patent litigation (Somaya 2003; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001), 
datasets reported by the authors as reasonably comprehensive representations of patent 
litigation in the United States.  Our Figure 1 demonstrates that the sheer number of patents 
litigated has been growing steadily since the 1960s, but has not appeared to change markedly 
as a share of applications filed.  As such, our data demonstrate a pattern roughly consistent 
with data presented in Somaya (2003),37 although our data shows two important differences.  
First, our data are more complete in the later years, a consequence of the lagged nature of 
litigation events (we collected our data in 2005 while Somaya collected data in 1999-2000 for 
the 2003 paper).  Second, our data appear to be more comprehensive in the early years.  This 
finding is not necessarily inconsistent with Somaya's findings, in that he reports, and analyzes 
throughout the article, cases filed per patent while we report litigated patents (by application 
year).  Thus, the underreporting of cases by the District Courts to the USPTO that Somaya 
cites in his article in the early years of his study (prior to 1983) is unlikely to have as marked 
an impact on patents in the earliest years of our sample (prior to 1975) because we are 
matching on application date and there exist long lags between patent application and patent 
litigation.  Another explanation may be that our data is in fact more comprehensive in these 
early years:  Westlaw™ announces that its litigation data is supplemented—which may 
indicate that it has found a source for these "missing" data.38 
[Figure A1 about here] 
[Figure A2 about here] 
We also benchmarked our data against statistics reported by Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2001).  Our Figure 2 demonstrates that the litigation rate for granted patents year-on-year 
(based on application year) fluctuates between 6.8 per thousand and 9.5 per thousand from 
1975-1995, with an apparent growth in litigation rates through 1995 until right censoring 
becomes apparent in the statistics for years after 1995.  These figures are roughly consistent 
with statistics detailed by Lanjouw and Schankerman, who report 10.7 cases filed per 
thousand patents 1980-84, and 6.3 patents per thousand that show a litigation event in their 
lifetime.  Our figure for the same time period (1980-84), by application year, is 8.0 litigated 
patents per thousand.  Our larger share may be the result of more cases having been revealed 
over time, or that our data are indeed more comprehensive as a result of data collection in the 
Westlaw™ database.39 
[Table A1 about here] 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) also report statistics for litigation in broad technology 
classes, and compare the characteristics of litigated and non-litigated patents, thus allowing us 
to further benchmark our data.  We summarize their findings, and ours, in Table 1, in which 
we apply the same technology-class and application-year definitions used in Lanjouw and 
                                                 
37  Somaya reports cases filed from 1975-95 (Somaya, 2003: Figure 1).   
38  "The LITALERT (Patent and Trademark Litigation Alert) database contains records for patent and trademark 
litigation lawsuits filed in ninety-four US District courts that have been reported to the Commissioner of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Also included are records for thousands of lawsuits 
filed since the early 1970's that have never been published in the Official Gazette."  Westlaw.com. 
39   Ibid. 
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Schankerman to our data.40  The table demonstrates that the technology field effects for cases 
filed per thousand patents and patents litigated per thousand (when the technology effects are 
compared to the sample mean) are roughly equivalent, and virtually identical when compared 
to the means in each sample.  We surmise that differences reflect the fact that patents in these 
technology classes are more likely to be involved in multiple suit filings. 
 
Appendix B 
We test our priors concerning “value” correlates of US patents by examining the number of 
claims, forward citations, and grant lags of both the (1) litigated sample and the (2) litigated 
sample for which we found EPO equivalents, comparing these against our control group 
(unlitigated) patentsUS.  We note at the forefront that the incidence of litigation has been 
shown to be positively correlated with other indicators of patent “value.”  Our number of 
observations is somewhat smaller in these samples because full data on these characteristics 
was available only through 2002 grants.  Our results are summarized in Table B1. 
[Table B1 about here] 
As we anticipated, the mean number of claims for litigated US patents is significantly higher 
than for US control group patents.  Moreover, the mean number of claims in litigated patents 
for which an EPO equivalent exists is again significantly higher than the sample of litigated 
patents.  This finding suggests to us, consistent with findings in Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2001), that the number of claims is positively correlated with patent value.  However, a 
larger number of claims may actually be a cause of litigation if additional claims increase the 
probability of conflicts between patent owners. 
Table B1 also contains information on the number of citations received by our US patents.  
Our litigated patent sample shows a nearly three-fold increase in the number of forward 
citations as compared to control group (unlitigated) patents, and that factor rises to a more 
than four-fold increase when we compute the statistics for litigated patents for which an EPO 
equivalent exists.  Both comparisons yield highly significant test results.  These results 
suggest to us that both litigation, and the combination of litigation and seeking a patent in the 
EPO, are positive and significant value indicators for US patents. 
We also compute the likelihood that a patent applicant used the “continuation” procedure in 
the US Patent Office, and the added associated grant lags.  The continuation, essentially a 
procedural revision of a patent application that allows the applicant added time in 
examination, has been associated with secrecy strategies (Graham, 2004) and with other value 
correlates (Graham and Mowery, 2004).  We find that continuations occur in approximately 
27% of the patent applications of our control group sample, while about 42% of our litigated 
patents show a continuation application lineage.  Interestingly, litigated patents for which 
there is an EPO equivalent are much less likely to issue after a continuation, with only about 
12% of these patents showing continuation process.  We surmise that the rewards to using 
                                                 
40  "The IPC [international patent class] categories included in each of these groups are: Drugs and Health: A61 
and A01N; Chemical: A62, B31, C01–C20, D–; Electronic: G01–G21, H–; Mechanical: B21–B68 not 
including B31, C21–C30, E01–F40."  Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), Table 1.  They use patents with 
application dates 1980-1984, as do we for this comparison, although we drop the very small number of 
patents issued after their original working-paper date of 1997 (0.02% of our sample). 
 
 2
continuation may be significantly blunted by the publication rules in Europe, although a 
complete explanation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our results in Table B1 make it clear that calculating time from application to grant using the 
“application date” listed on the patent produces significant, but not large, differences between 
the litigated and control samples.  Consistent with findings in Graham (2004), using the first 
“continuation application” date to calculate grant lags in these US patents yields much more 
substantial, and interesting, differences.  For the litigated patent sample, continuation grant 
lags (3.48 years) are some 46 weeks longer than the mean for all patents (2.60 years).  
However, reflecting the reduced use of continuations among US applicants also seeking EPO 
patents, grant lags are actually lower for these patents (2.25 years) than for our control 
patents.  The implications of these findings, and the insights they may offer to strategic 
international patent application procedures are beyond the scope of this paper, but demand 
further research.  In sum, however, our findings support those of earlier research:  litigated US 
patents suggest in their manifest and latent characteristics added efforts by their applicants, 
and exhibit indications of value (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Hall, et al. 2004). 
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Appendix Figure A1 
Comparison, US Patent Applications, and 
US Litigated Patents, by application year 
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Appendix Figure A2 
Share of U.S. Patents Involved in Litigation, by Application Year 
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